## Oversight DA

### IAA UQ/L---Intel Sharing

#### **IAA increases oversight, especially for intel sharing**

Clark 7-19 (Douglas Clark is a Clovis, New Mexico-based journalist possessing a fervent passion for the craft. A Southern Illinois University - Carbondale graduate, Douglas has experience in electronic, print and web platforms with an emphasis on news and content development. “Senate Select Committee on Intelligence advances legislation authorizing increased funding, oversight”, https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/77770-senate-select-committee-on-intelligence-advances-legislation-authorizing-increased-funding-oversight/)LR

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has advanced legislation introduced by U.S. Sen. Susan Collins (D-ME) that authorizes funding, provides legal authorities, and improves congressional Intelligence community oversight. The committee passed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (S. 4503) by a unanimous 16-0 vote. “The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 will enhance the Intelligence Community’s ability to arm policy-makers with the necessary information and tools to defend U.S. interests against foreign adversaries,” Collins said. “The bill bolsters intelligence support for Ukraine, improves the timeliness of the security clearance process, takes a major step forward to promote cybersecurity, and increases congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community.” Bill provisions include improving Ukraine’s intelligence amid the country defending its territorial integrity and sovereignty since Russia’s second invasion; establishing cybersecurity minimum standards for classified networks and systems; ensuring continued support to the victims of anomalous health incidents or Havana Syndrome and maintaining continued oversight over the Intelligence Community investigations into the causes such health incidents; and bolstering congressional oversight of Intelligence Community activities by mandating the Director of National Intelligence submit an annual report describing actions to address all open recommendations from the Comptroller General of the United States (GAO). “I look forward to continuing to work with Chairman Mark Warner, Vice Chairman Marco Rubio, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines and CIA Director William Burns to make progress on each of these important initiatives,” Collins said.

### NDAA UQ

#### NDAA increases oversight

White House 7-12 ( “STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY H.R. 7900 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/H.R.-7900-NDAA-SAP.pdf) LR

The Administration strongly supports enactment of a National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for a 62nd consecutive year and is grateful for the strong, bipartisan work of the House Armed Services Committee on behalf of America’s national defense. The Administration looks forward to continuing to work with the Congress to set appropriate and responsible levels of defense and non-defense spending to support the security of the Nation. Alongside a strategically sound defense budget, a strong economy and investments in diplomacy, development, and economic statecraft are critical to ensuring that the Nation is positioned to respond to the myriad of national security challenges we face today and in the future. The Department of Defense’s (DoD) Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 budget request was informed by the National Defense Strategy, which calls on DoD to advance four key priorities: defend the homeland, deter strategic attacks, deter aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, and build a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem. Taking care of the All-Volunteer force, their families, and DoD civilian employees and contractors is vital to ensuring a resilient military today and in the future. It is an Administration priority, and President Biden appreciates support for the pay raise for military service members. In a time of rapidly evolving military activities and capabilities by our competitors – accelerated by emerging technologies and intensified by the potential for new threats to strategic stability – America’s network of allies and partners continues to act as a force multiplier in support of U.S. national defense. Investments authorized in the NDAA in support of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the European Deterrence Initiative will help address the changing global landscape and prepare the country for future challenges and threats. The Administration looks forward to working with the Congress to address its concerns, a number of which are outlined below. Establishment of Army and Air Force Safety Commands. The Administration places a high priority on safety and has multiple ongoing efforts to improve DoD wide governance of safety incidents. The Administration opposes section 386 because such a reorganization would hinder these ongoing efforts, including the establishment and chartering of the Joint Safety Council as directed in the FY 2022 NDAA, implementing the 25 recommendations of the National Commission on Military Aviation Safety, reinvigorating the Defense Safety Oversight Council, and codifying Department-wide safety business processes and data standards to support a proactive enterprise risk management approach.

### Ukraine UQ proves

#### Ukraine has created stricter oversight mechanisms

* At: 4000, new sc is different from ongoing operations too
* Ukraine changes increase in oversight and transparency

Savoy and Staguhn 7-5 (Conor M. Savoy is a senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Janina Staguhn is a research associate for the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS. Janina Staguhn is a research associate for the Project on Prosperity and Development (PPD) and Project on U.S. Leadership in Development (USLD) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she supports the projects’ research agenda and coordinates events. Prior to becoming a program coordinator in August 2019, she was a graduate student research assistant at the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law and a research associate at the Innovations for Peace and Development research lab. She also worked on the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign and for the Colorado Democratic Party. Her research interests include conflict stabilization, forced migration, security policy, and human rights. She holds an M.A. in global policy studies from the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin and a B.A. in international studies and political science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. “Balancing Oversight and Risk: Transparency for U.S. Foreign Assistance to Ukraine”, https://www.csis.org/analysis/balancing-oversight-and-risk-transparency-us-foreign-assistance-ukraine)LR

Since Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February, the United States has provided unprecedented levels of security, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. This assistance reflects the United States’ remarkable commitment to a country fighting for its right to exist as a sovereign democratic country. In two separate packages, Congress has appropriated $54 billion in assistance to Ukraine. On an inflation-adjusted basis, the United States has already allocated more money for assistance to Ukraine in the past five months than it did on a yearly basis during the height of the Marshall Plan. Given the unprecedented levels of assistance, and that Ukraine has a history with corruption issues, proper oversight of these funds will be critical. The most recent bill faced a delay due to oversight concerns. Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) held up the bill because he wanted to appoint the leader of the watchdog of Afghanistan’s reconstruction (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or SIGAR), John F. Sopko, to take on a similar position to provide oversight for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Senator Paul’s concerns are the same that he voices with every piece of foreign assistance legislation; however, 10 other Republican senators and 57 Republican House members also ultimately joined him in voting against the final spending bills. The assistance bill eventually passed Congress, but the delay reflects what will likely be increasing calls for oversight on foreign assistance to Ukraine. Since 2014, Ukraine has made significant progress in transparency, including through the digitization of city planning and public procurement, monitoring of public officials' assets and lifestyles, and investigative journalism, yet endemic corruption remains a challenge. Estimates in 2021 still showed that Ukraine’s budget was losing $37 billion a year due to corruption. In recent months, Kyiv has in some cases returned to relying on oligarchs for government funding of both immediate assistance and future reconstruction, which opens the door for oligarchs to be able to promote their self-interest through the government. Down the line, instances of corruption, and especially misuse of foreign assistance, could cost Ukraine its good standing and endanger further aid from the United States. Oversight for U.S. assistance to Ukraine is necessary to ensure continued support for aid packages by both the American public and the congresspeople who represent them. But it is not clear that more oversight than what is already provided by the inspectors general at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department is needed. In addition, the recent supplemental Ukraine bill included additional provisions related to the direct economic assistance provided to Ukraine. An additional layer of oversight along the lines of the special inspectors general used in Iraq and Afghanistan is not immediately necessary. Indeed, such an approach could hinder the effective delivery of foreign assistance at a time when speed, flexibility, and effectiveness should guide U.S. support for Ukraine. Presently, the necessary mechanisms to create immediate accountability for U.S. assistance to Ukraine largely exist, and the funding bill passed included several additional oversight mechanisms. The most recent aid package to Ukraine included over $8 billion in direct economic assistance to Ukraine’s government. The spending bill include requirements that these funds are subject to a memorandum of understanding between the U.S. government and government of Ukraine that includes descriptions of how the funds will be used. Additionally, the money must be kept in a separate account that cannot be combined with other funds. The bill also asked for reporting from the State Department and USAID, specifically noting that “the Secretary of State or the Administrator of USAID, as appropriate, shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on the uses of any funds provided for direct financial support to the Government of Ukraine . . . and the results achieved, not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act and every 90 days thereafter.” This funding for oversight and legislative provisions will provide transparency over the economic support funds provided directly to the government of Ukraine. Finally, the bill also included funding for oversight of various U.S. agencies’ spending, including $5 million for the Department of State inspector general and $1 million for the USAID inspector general. This additional money provides the Office of Inspector General at both agencies with the resources needed to monitor assistance for Ukraine. The pressure for effective oversight of the large amount of money appropriated to support Ukraine’s defense of its country is understandable. There are real and serious concerns about the level of corruption in prewar Ukraine; however, there is little evidence that this corruption has affected the significant volumes of aid that Ukraine has received since the 2014 Maidan revolution. Given the stakes involved—Ukraine’s continued existence as an independent, democratic state—there is significant incentive for the government in Kyiv to ensure that the money provided is put to its intended uses. On the other hand, the relevant U.S. agencies must respond to congressional demands for oversight and work with Ukrainian partners in a transparent way to highlight the significant impact foreign assistance is having on the outcome of the war. The U.S. government must utilize existing mechanisms to demonstrate transparency and provide accountability to Congress on this important money. Political dynamics in Congress demand that the administration do so. Otherwise, the flow of aid may stop, or additional oversight mechanisms will be created that disincentivize the necessary risk-taking critical for Ukraine’s success both during the war and throughout subsequent reconstruction efforts.

### Asats---Link

#### Satellites specifically cause overstretch due to infighting

Best 02 (Richard A. Best, Jr Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. “CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Order Code RL31369 Imagery Intelligence: Issues for Congress”, https://irp.fas.org/crs/RL31369.pdf)LR

Intelligence derived from satellites has become an essential element of military operations and foreign policymaking. In particular, precise imagery from space-based collection systems makes possible the effective use of precision-guided munitions that is becoming the basis of U.S. defense planning. Imagery intelligence also provides the factual bases for addressing many foreign policy issues. Imagery is collected by satellites acquired and operated by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an organization with a record of enormous technological achievements since its creation in 1961. Imagery collected by the NRO is processed, analyzed, exploited, and disseminated by another organization, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). NIMA was established in 1996, incorporating the Defense Mapping Agency and various intelligence offices. Congress has been concerned with satellite imagery because of its critical importance and its high costs. Independent commissions established by Congress to assess the state of the imagery intelligence effort have concluded that significant changes need to be made in the way the Nation’s imagery effort is conducted. There is a consensus that greater emphasis should be placed on better collection targeting and improving processing, exploitation, and dissemination (the processes collectively termed TPED); that greater attention should be given to acquiring commercial imagery; and that the management of the imagery effort may need to be changed. Even before the events of September 11, 2001, there appeared to be a fairly widespread view within congressional committees that at least some additional funding should be directed towards imagery collection and TPED. Subsequent military campaigns have underscored the use of imagery in military operations and other counterterrorist efforts. NIMA may not be ready to accept such a broad role within the Intelligence Community. According to a media account, Robert Zitz, a senior NIMA official, has stated that for the present integrating imagery and geospatial data and imagery remains the agency’s primary focus; “right now,” according to Zitz, “we don’t feel that we are ready to take on the challenge of doing imagery and signals intelligence both in one architecture.”23 NIMA officials undoubtedly recognize that such fusion would not only be technically challenging but it could involve conflicts with other, older, and larger agencies that could complicate NIMA’s overall missions. Peter Marino, the chairman of the NIMA Commission, inApril 3, 2001 testimony, indicated continuing concern that NIMA lacks adequate resources for such a task: and I think what you’re creating is a recipe for disaster for the day when [FIA] starts dropping down volumes of data that is considerably greater than the volumes of data that we’re seeing today and expects an organization like NIMA to start processing and exploiting that data. That doesn’t close at all right now with the budget that NIMA has to do TPED.24 Beyond questions of resources, some observers express concern that the heavy responsibility of managing a multi-int geospatial grid would be assigned to a relatively new organization that is a DOD combat support agency. According to this view, developing and acquiring the necessary systemsthat manage the flow of imagery will be a daunting task that NIMA will probably be able to accomplish only with additional funding and by drawing upon outside assistance. They suggest that establishment of collection requirements–determining which targets should get the highest priorities–more appropriately should become the responsibility of the DCI who has, in any event, been assigned the responsibility by statute.25 Nor do they believe would NIMA be a logical candidate to address the tasking of the sigint collection efforts of the National Security Agency (NSA) for which longstanding interagency procedures exist. Organizing a process by which analysts in various agencies can annotate data on an imagery base would be a logical NIMA responsibility, but attempting to become a “final authority” for validating such annotation would, at least in some cases, appear to be an overstretch that could cause prolonged interagency disagreements.